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Abstract
In this paper we present three attacks on private inter-
nal networks behind a NAT and a corresponding new
protection mechanism, Internal Network Policy, to mit-
igate a wide range of attacks that penetrate internal net-
works behind a NAT. In the attack scenario, a victim is
tricked to visit the attacker’s website, which contains a
malicious script that lets the attacker access the victim’s
internal network in different ways, including opening a
port in the NAT or sending a sophisticated request to
local devices. The first attack utilizes DNS Rebinding
in a particular way, while the other two demonstrate dif-
ferent methods of attacking the network, based on ap-
plication security vulnerabilities. Following the attacks,
we provide a new browser security policy, Internal Net-
work Policy (INP), which protects against these types of
vulnerabilities and attacks. This policy is implemented
in the browser just like Same Origin Policy (SOP) and
prevents malicious access to internal resources by exter-
nal entities.
1 Introduction
A large class of malicious exploits on the internet trick
users to transmit an undesired request to a website that
trusts them, CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery) [1] is
an example sub class of these attacks. A key mech-
anism to limit the capabilities of these attacks is the
SOP (Same Origin Policy) [2], which restricts the type
of scripts that one site can execute on the browser,
in the context of a different site. Recently, attacks
with the same general principle have been presented,
causing the victim’s browser to access IoT devices and
other resources on the victim’s private network, behind
a NAT [3,4].
We review the previously known attack by Acar et
al. [3] on an internal network that uses DNS Rebind-
ing [5] to circumvent the SOP through sophisticated
mapping of DNS entries to IoT devices in the inter-
nal network. This attack lets the attacker gain access
to IoT devices only by tricking the victim to surf to
a malicious website. Following this attack we present
three additional attacks, each circumventing SOP in a
different way. The first one is similar in its flow to the
Acar at el. attack but, unlike it, instead of gaining
access to IoT devices, we utilize DNS Rebinding and
UPnP (Universal Plug & Play protocol) [6] to directly
attack the home router and gain access to the internal
network, thus demonstrating that home routers, which
are considered also to be a kind of IoT device, are the
weakest point of the internal network. 75% of our tested
home routers, which are supplied by ISPs in our region,
are vulnerable to this attack. Next we demonstrate two
more attacks on devices behind a NAT which do not
use DNS Rebinding. The first targets IoT devices and
achieves the same results as the attack of Acar et al. [3],
while the second bypasses previously known application
security mitigations [7] to attack home routers.
To circumvent these and similar attacks on devices
behind a NAT, we present Internal Network Policy
(INP), a new natural complementary extension of the
browser security policy, SOP. INP prevents all attack
types presented, and enhances the protection and se-
curity of private networks. INP can also be used for
private networks without a NAT, though it does not
provide the same security isolation that a NAT pro-
vides. One of the major advantages of implementing
defensive solutions in web browsers is the frequency of
browser updates [8], in contrast to network devices such
as home routers or IoT devices.
INP stops attacks on devices behind a NAT that trick
the victim to surf to a malicious website. There are
other attack vectors for penetrating an internal net-
work, such as gaining physical access to the network
or exploiting a vulnerability in software which commu-
nicates directly with the internet (such as an online chat
or e-mail). These other attack vectors are more compli-
cated and less common than attacks that use the web
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browser’s functionality [9, 10]. Note that these other
attacks are supposedly stopped by IPS and firewall se-
curity devices.
Paper organization. After reviewing related work
(Section 2), we review the attack by Acar et al. and
present three new attacks (Section 3). Each attack high-
lights a different aspect of the root problem, all of which
are solved by INP, the new security policy suggested
here. We propose the INP defensive mechanism (Sec-
tion 4), explain how it works and why it protects from
attacking behind a NAT, including a proof of concept
implementation. In the end we show the experiments
(Section 5) that we have done to perform the attacks,
check which devices are vulnerable and test the effec-
tiveness of INP. We make parts of our work available
online, as described in Section 6.
2 Related Work
2.1 Attacks on IoT behind NAT
In their paper, ”Web-based Attacks to Discover and
Control Local IoT Devices” [3], Acar et al. demon-
strated an attack on IoT devices in home networks be-
hind a NAT. The attack is based on DNS Rebinding.
Other attacks that use DNS Rebinding to attack pri-
vate networks are presented in Dorsey’s article [4].
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the at-
tack of Acar et al. and the three new attacks that we
present here. Two of the new attacks that we present in
Section 3 gain access to private networks without using
DNS Rebinding.
2.2 Preventing attacks on the internal
network
Many defensive approaches have been created to deal
with attacking private networks behind a NAT. Some
of them tried to solve DNS Rebinding [11, 12] by cre-
ating specific rules in the home routers [13]. Most of
the given approaches were difficult to implement and
integrate with network devices. Moreover, many other
application security mitigation concepts were invented,
but vulnerabilities are still found and exploited, espe-
cially in IoT devices [14].
Johns et al. present extended Same Origin Policy,
”eSOP” [15]. Johns et al. analyze the weaknesses of
SOP and indicate DNS Rebinding as the main problem
which should be solved. eSOP was invented to com-
bat DNS Rebinding by using new headers which should
be supplied by web servers in HTTP responses. In our
paper, we analyze the problem of attacking internal net-
work behind a NAT differently, and expose a different
new root problem. A solution that is based only on DNS
Rebinding cannot prevent our second and third attacks,
nor does eSOP stop our first attack. The INP presented
here copes with both DNS Rebinding and other attacks,
including the new one presented in this paper. INP is
secure by default, which means that if a vendor’s device
is not compatible with it, external access to the device
is prevented. Table 1 provides in addition a comparison
of eSOP and SOP relative to these attacks.
Note that our first attack (Subsection 3.3) bypasses
eSOP, even though the attack uses DNS Rebinding. Al-
though eSOP prevents an attack script from reading
HTTP responses from other websites, our first attack
needs nothing but sending a UPnP command in an
HTTP request to the home router, the response is ig-
nored.
Another IoT defensive approach is the concept of
MUD (Manufacturer Usage Description) [16], which lets
IoT vendors provide a type of white-list specifying their
device legitimate network behavior which can then be
monitored and enforced by appropriate security devices.
However, MUD relies on various IoT vendors to provide
the MUD file. Moreover, the attacks shown in this pa-
per, are not prevented by MUD, as they exploit the
local HTTP servers of the IoT devices, which should
legitimately be used in the LAN.
While implementing INP on Chromium, we no-
ticed that in 2017 Mike West offered modifications to
Chromium [17] that head in the same direction as INP,
preventing external resources from accessing internal
network devices using the browser as a stepping stone.
However, we believe the INP presented here addresses
a wider range of issues not considered by the modifica-
tions of [17], including (i) dynamic and automatic clas-
sification of internal IP address space by the browser,
dealing with cases where the private IP addresses are
not only according to RFC 1918 [18]. This is neces-
sary in bigger organizations, such as large companies
or universities, which do not always use RFC 1918 ad-
dresses for their internal networks. Furthermore, with
the growing support for IPv6 many use cases for RFC
1918 addresses cease to exist [15], (ii) INP as suggested
here provides configuration API rules that network ad-
ministrators can manually add internal IP addresses on
top of the default that should include the RFC 1918
ranges, (iii) our INP preflight request provides details
about the IP address of the request initiator, thus en-
abling vendors of network devices (IoT, home routers,
etc.) to allow cross site references if they come from
specific external IP addresses such as the IoT vendor
site, and (iv) the modifications proposed by West do
not always prevent attacks whose HTTP requests’ des-
tination hosts are given as domain names, rather than
IP addresses, when the domain name has not yet been
resolved. This still enables attacks such as those relying
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Building Blocks Outcome eSOP mitigate INP mitigate
Acar et al. DNS rebinding Control IoTs Yes Yes
Attack I DNS rebinding, Preflight action UPnP on home router No Yes
Attack II CSRF Control IoTs No Yes
Attack III Network proximity, XSS Control home router No Yes
Table 1: Attacks comparison and mitigation techniques comparison.
on DNS Rebinding. Our INP implementation (see Sub-
section 4.4) handles these cases and protects internal
resources from being accessed through domain names.
3 Attacks behind a NAT
Four attacks that execute a script (originated in the
attacker’s website) on the web browser in order to access
a device in the internal network are reviewed here. First
we provide a basic background for SOP (Same Origin
Policy). Then, we review the attack of Acar et al. [3],
and go on to present three new attacks.
3.1 Same Origin Policy
SOP (Same Origin Policy) [2] is a standard security pol-
icy used by most browsers in order to prevent a mali-
cious script on one page from obtaining access to sensi-
tive data on another web page through that page’s Doc-
ument Object Model (DOM). An origin is defined as a
combination of URI scheme, host name and port num-
ber. Under the policy, a web browser permits scripts
contained in one web page to access data in a second
web page only if both web pages have the same origin.
Static resources such as images or frames may be em-
bedded cross-origin.
Two major rules of SOP are the following restrictions:
• Blocking the response. If a script sends an
HTTP request to a site of a different origin (i.e.,
cross origin), SOP prevents the script from read-
ing the response, unless the other site allows it
with corresponding fields set in the HTTP response
headers [19].
• Deny complex requests. An HTTP request is
considered complex if it contains customized HTTP
headers, or non-trivial textual content type (other-
wise the request is considered simple). If a script
sends a cross origin complex request, SOP blocks
that request by default. Instead, SOP instructs
the browser to send a preceding preflight request
[20], asking the other site whether it allows the orig-
inal request to be sent to it. If the other site allows
that with corresponding fields set in the headers
in the response to the preflight request, then the
browser sends the original request.
3.2 Background: Acar et al. attack on
IoTs [3]
The attacker’s goal in the attack presented by Acar et
al. is to access local devices in the victim’s network in
order to extract information from or send commands
to the devices. The script which instructs the browser
to make that access is placed in the attacker’s evil.com
website. First, the attacker tricks the premise user to
visit its website using the script with the bait. A direct
request to the IoT device points to a different origin (the
IP address of the device is different than the address
of evil.com), so the script would not be able to access
the response. In order to perform the request on the
local IoT device and overcome the SOP, DNS Rebinding
is used, switching the IP of evil.com to the IP of the
desired internal device.
The following is a step by step detail of the attack
(see Figure 1):
1. The victim surfs to the attacker’s website
evil.com.
(a) The browser tries to resolve the IP address of
evil.com. The attacker’s controlled response
points to its external web server, with low
TTL value (e.g. one second).
(b) The victim sends an HTTP GET request to
evil.com, which responds with the attacker’s
malicious script.
2. The malicious script repeatedly sends GET
requests to http://evil.com/evil-test. Until
the evil.com entry in the victim DNS cache is
evicted (due to expired TTL) the request keeps go-
ing to the attacker’s website, which responds with
HTTP 200 OK (indicating that the request has suc-
ceeded) responses.
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3. Attacker changes evil.com DNS record.
When the entry’s TTL expires, DNS Rebinding by
the attacker replaces the evil.com entry to point to
the internal IP address of the desired device.
4. DNS Rebinding is completed. The victim tries
again to resolve evil.com, which is now resolved to
the IP address of the desired internal device.
5. Local device is accessed by the attacker. The
attack script can now send HTTP requests directly
to the HTTP server on the device and read re-
sponses, allowing the attacker to extract informa-
tion from or send commands to the device.
NAT Gateway
Attacker’s Web Server
Home NetworkInternet
Victim
1.2.3.4
2
1b
5
DNS request & response – evil.com is at 1.2.3.4
DNS request & response – evil.com is at 
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10.0.0.8
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DNS Server
3
Attacker changes evil.com 
DNS record
Figure 1: Flow of Acar et al. attack
In their paper [3], Acar et al. use an internal scan
before the attack in order to detect specific IoT devices.
Later they use the results of the scan to execute the
presented attack.
3.3 Attack I: Attacking home routers
with DNS Rebinding & UPnP
In this attack, the goal is to open a port in the NAT
on the gateway (the victim’s home router). It lets the
attacker access practically any device in the network
without any prior scan. The instruction to open the
port is placed in a script that is located in the attacker’s
evil.com website. Most of the attack steps are similar to
the previous ones presented by Acar et al. Nevertheless,
this attack focuses directly on the home router, the sin-
gle critical point of failure in the network. The attack
is effective on 75% of the routers that are supplied by
ISPs in our region, which we have verified (vulnerable
devices and experiments are detailed in Section 5).
Together with DNS Rebinding, this attack takes ad-
vantage of the UPnP (Universal Plug & Play) [6] pro-
tocol, used by most network devices, including home
routers. A router’s UPnP server supports HTTP re-
quests which contain commands, such as adding a port
forwarding rule or changing the DNS server.
The full attack flow can be viewed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Attack I Flow
1. The victim surfs to the attacker’s controlled
website, evil.com.
(a) The same as in the Acar et al. attack above.
(b) The same as in the Acar et al. attack above.
2. Extracting the victim’s gateway internal IP
address. The WebRTC [21] extension allows
JavaScript to query the local client IP address. Ac-
quiring the victim’s internal IP address lets the at-
tacker predict with a good probability of success
the internal IP address of the gateway. Most of the
networks share the same standards.
3. The malicious script repeatedly sends UPnP
AddPortMapping requests to evil.com.
(a) Unlike the requests sent in the Acar et al. at-
tack, UPnP HTTP requests are used here:
• Destination port may be different than 80
- which means that the UPnP request is
considered cross origin.
• The content type is XML - which means
the UPnP request is considered complex
(as explained in Subsection 3.1).
Therefore, preflight [20] requests are triggered
and sent to evil.com, which responds with cor-
responding ”allow” headers. Because the at-
tacker lacks any prior knowledge about the
victim’s router, the attack script sends the
UPnP command to evil.com to all the known
UPnP ports in parallel (tested UPnP ports
and URLs are demonstrated in Appendix A).
(b) The victim’s browser now repeatedly sends
UPnP AddPortMapping requests, as in-
structed in the script, to the web server at
evil.com, which ignores the content and replies
with HTTP 200 OK.
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4. Attacker changes the evil.com DNS record.
It is the same as in the Acar et al. attack above,
but it replaces the evil.com entry to point to the
internal IP address of the router.
5. DNS Rebinding is completed. It is the same
as in the Acar et al. attack above. The victim
resolves evil.com again, which is now resolved to
the internal IP address of the gateway.
6. UPnP AddPortMapping request is sent to
the gateway. The attacker’s script is still ex-
ecuted in the victim’s browser, thus the victim
sends the UPnP requests to evil.com, which is now
the victim’s home router. The attack goal is now
achieved, a port forwarding rule is added, and the
attacker can directly access the home network.
Except for the third step, most of the flow is very sim-
ilar to the flow of Acar et al. In comparison to the attack
by Acar et al., an initial scan of the internal network is
not necessary. The ability to add port forwarding rules
to the home router is actually the significant step in
taking over the victim’s network, as local devices can be
accessed directly. By using a RCE (Remote Code Ex-
ecution) vulnerability [22] or simple credentials, which
are still common in many home devices [23], the attacker
can gain control of the entire internal network.
In Section 5 we show that 75% of the examined
routers, supplied by the ISPs in our region are vulner-
able to our attack. In the demonstrated attack flow,
we target known UPnP servers whose URLs and TCP
ports are fixed and static. In Appendix A we show how
we are able to attack routers whose UPnP TCP port is
randomized and dynamically changes. Routers whose
UPnP URLs contain a long, random identifier, such as
UUID, are not vulnerable as the attacker cannot predict
the URL to target.
3.4 Attack II: Attacking internal de-
vices without DNS Rebinding
The second attack is based on the observation that SOP
allows a site from one origin to send simple HTTP re-
quests to a site from a different origin with no preceding
preflight request (in contrast to complex cross origin re-
quests). That means that if an IoT device can be con-
trolled only by receiving a simple HTTP request, an at-
tack script can exploit it, without DNS Rebinding. The
request may utilize the device API, or in some cases ex-
ploit a vulnerability such as BOF (Buffer Overflow) [24],
in order to execute code on the device.
Therefore, this attack demonstrates that a holistic
solution to attacks behind a NAT, cannot be solved,
by just preventing DNS Rebinding.
In Figure 3, an example of such an attack is demon-
strated.
Home NetworkInternet Vulnerable IoT Device
192.168.1.8
Surfing to evil.com
Victim
Attacker’s Web Server
2
1
2 2 3
Figure 3: Attack II Flow
1. The victim is tricked to surf to the attacker’s con-
trolled website, evil.com - the browser retrieves the
malicious script.
2. Through the malicious script, the attacker first
scans the local network, to discover vulnerable de-
vices (technical details available in Appendix A).
Let us assume a vulnerable device is found with
internal IP address 192.168.1.8.
3. The script sends a simple [19] HTTP request to the
device at 192.168.1.8, and completes the attack.
This attack may let an attacker remotely control IoT
such as multimedia devices (smart TVs, AV receivers)
by their web management API, or even send crafted
HTTP requests to exploit IoT vulnerabilities such as
BOF (Buffer Overflow) [25], which would lead to re-
mote code execution on the device. In our experiments,
we provide few examples of vulnerable IoT devices (see
Section 5).
3.5 Attack III: Attacking home routers
through static HTML elements
This attack lets the attacker control the victim’s home
router by accessing the router’s web management in-
terface through the victim’s browser. Besides the fa-
miliar requirement of tricking the victim to surf to the
attacker’s malicious evil.com web site, the attack also re-
quires geographical proximity of an attacking machine
to the victim. This prerequisite is explained in the se-
quel.
This attack is capable of making the following pene-
trations:
• Enabling the victim’s browser to access the home
router by using static HTML elements instead
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of dynamic scripts. Therefore, SOP and other pro-
tection mechanisms such as the NoScript Firefox
extension [26] do not stop it since they are applied
only to dynamic script elements. That proves that
attacks behind a NAT could be performed in dif-
ferent ways than executing a script on the victim’s
browser.
• It enables the attacker to send any type of
HTTP request (including complex ones) to
the victim’s router without DNS Rebind-
ing. In comparison to the previous attacks, attack
I (Subsection 3.3) sent UPnP requests, which are
complex, but DNS Rebinding was required. At-
tack II (Subsection 3.4) didn’t use DNS Rebinding,
however it enabled the attacker to send only sim-
ple HTTP requests to the victim’s devices in the
internal network.
At a high level, this attack exploits a vulnerability in
the AP (Access Point) List feature of home routers.
Router web interfaces which include this feature ex-
pose a web page with an HTML table that displays
Wifi networks that are accessible to the router. One of
the table’s columns often displays the networks’ names
(known as SSID), which are derived from networks’
routers. With sufficient geographical proximity to the
victim, an attacker who sets a Wifi hotspot can control
one of the entries in the victim’s router AP List table.
A basic Wifi hotspot (e.g., created by a smartphone),
would be accessible to a router from a maximum dis-
tance of less than hundred meters. However, depending
on the attacker’s antenna and transmitting abilities, it
can be accessible from hundreds of kilometers [27].
If the attacker sets its network name to be an HTML
script tag, such as
<script src="http://evil.com/evil.js"/>
and the victim’s router AP List web page does not en-
code or handle networks’ names properly, then the at-
tacker’s network name would be interpreted as native
HTML.
If the victim surfs to evil.com while the malicious
hotspot is accessible to the victim’s router, the only
thing left for the attacker to complete the attack is to
redirect the victim from evil.com to the router’s AP
List page. Then the attacker’s controlled script (lo-
cated at http://evil.com/evil.js) is executed on the vic-
tim’s browser. The most significant consequence is that
the attacker’s script is executed in the context of the
victim’s router AP List page, which means that it can
freely access the router’s web interface without any re-
striction by SOP.
This vulnerability belongs to a large class of vulner-
abilities, named XSS (Cross Site Scripting) [28]. Pre-
vious similar XSS vulnerabilities in home routers have
been shown [29], however they required the victim to
surf directly to the router vulnerable page (instead of
evil.com), which dramatically decreases the probability
of success.
Following is a step by step detail of the attack (see
Figure 4):
Attacker’s Hotspot
Attacker’s Web Server
Home NetworkInternet
Victim
2
4
5
3
6
1
Figure 4: Attack III Flow
1. The attacker sets up an access point, with network
name:
<script src="http://evil.com/evil.js"/>
The access point should be accessible by the vic-
tim’s router.
2. The victim surfs to the attacker’s controlled web-
site, evil.com - the browser retrieves the malicious
HTML page.
3. The malicious HTML identifies the victim’s router,
taking advantage of an HTML image element scan
technique, as explained in [30] (additional details
are available in Appendix A).
4. The attacker’s HTML makes a login request using
an HTML form (see [31] for details), to the home
router. We assume the credentials are default ones
(as discussed in [32]). This makes the victim’s ses-
sion the active session in the router.
5. The attacker’s HTML redirects the victim by set-
ting the DOM document location (see [33] for de-
tails) to the AP List panel page.
6. The XSS is invoked. The attacker’s access point’s
network name is now parsed as HTML, and a pre-
pared script (at http://evil.com/evil.js) is ready to
be executed, in the context of the router itself.
Later in our experiments (Section 5), we show that
41% of the tested routers supplied by ISPs in our region
are vulnerable to this attack.
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4 INP - Internal Network Policy
We suggest Internal Network Policy (INP), a security
policy that places strong restrictions on web browser
accesses to an internal network device from an external
web page, i.e., a web page whose source IP address is ex-
ternal to the network in which the browser is executing.
INP is complementary to SOP, and should be used in
addition to it. While SOP deals with cross origin access,
INP restricts external access to internal IP addresses.
The motivation for INP is the common principle of all
the attacks on devices behind a NAT that were discussed
in Section 3 and other similar attacks. The key principle
is the usage of a local web browser as a stepping stone for
attacks originating from an external server, on a local
device. INP is a security policy that prevents this type
of attacks through the browser.
At a high level consider two disjoint IP address
ranges, I (for internal) and E (for external). A
web page is called external if that web page is ser-
viced/downloaded from a server with an IP address in
E. A resource or web server, is called internal if its IP
address is in I.
A web browser that implements INP permits scripts
contained in an external web page to make a request, of
any kind, to an internal server only if the internal server
pre-approves the request. Pre-approval is implemented
with a preflight request-response exchange, similar to
the SOP preflight mechanism.
Definition 1. A cross-network request is an HTTP
request that is initiated by an external web page to an
internal resource.
4.1 INP detailed description
In our INP implementation the set of internal IP ad-
dresses I, that is used in order to detect cross-network
accesses, is determined in a dynamic way with an option
for the system administrator to edit the set.
Definition 2. The internal IP address range I, in
a given local network, is the union of the following IP
address ranges:
1. For an IPv4 address:
• The loopback space (127.0.0.0/8) defined in
Section 3.2.1.3 of RFC 1122 [34].
• The link-local space 169.254.0.0/16 defined in
RFC 3927 [35].
• The address space defined in Section 3 of RFC
1918 [18].
2. For an IPv6 address:
• The Local Address prefix (fc00::/7) defined in
Section 3 of RFC 4193 [36].
• The link-local prefix (fe80::/10) defined in Sec-
tion 2.5.6 of RFC 4291 [37].
3. The local network subnet address space, which
might not be part of the previous items.
4. The address spaces in an XML configuration file
prepared by the network admin (see Subsection 4.4).
Definition 3. The external IP address space, E,
with respect to a local network, is all the IP addresses
which are not in I.
Figure 5, outlines the process of cross-network request
handling by a web browser that follows the INP security
policy. Whenever the browser detects a cross-network
request, it first checks whether a cross-network request
with the same parameters (external source IP, internal
destination IP, HTTP headers and method), has been
already approved by a corresponding preflight exchange.
If this cross-network request has not yet been approved,
then the browser sends a preflight request to the server
at the internal destination IP address of the request.
According to the preflight response, the browser either
blocks or permits the cross-network request.
Cross-network 
request sent
Allows
?
Send preflight 
request
Cross-
network 
request
no
yes
yes
no
Cross-
network 
request 
blocked
Previous 
positive cached 
preflight 
response
Figure 5: INP process
A browser that implements INP keeps track of the
source IP address of each page and resource it receives,
and the destination IP address of each access it makes
to detect any cross-network access event (some imple-
mentation details are given in Subsection 4.4).
When a cross-network access event is detected and
no corresponding approval has been issued to it yet, a
preflight exchange with the destination internal server
is initiated. Table 2 provides the HTTP headers used in
the preflight request and response. The request headers
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provide the internal resource detailed information about
the external entity that has initiated this cross-network
access (web origin and IP address) and the method and
customized headers of the cross-network request. The
internal server responds with a preflight response setting
the headers to indicate whether it permits the cross-
network request or not. An additional header in the
response is X-INP-TTL, which gives the number of sec-
onds the response to the preflight request can be cached
and used without sending a new preflight request.
4.2 Security Evaluation
INP is designed to block cross-network accesses by de-
fault. Only accesses that obtain explicit permission
from the internal destination are permitted. Notice that
devices that do not implement INP preflight handling
are protected by default, ”no response” to the preflight
request is considered as a deny response.
Therefore, INP blocks by default attacks on devices
behind a NAT that use the browser as a stepping stone,
including all those we have presented in this paper, and
many others. In all the four attacks that were discussed
in Section 3 an external page, evil.com, made a cross-
network access to an internal device. INP detects the
cross-network access in all these attacks and blocks it
because it does not receive a positive response to the
preflight request.
We demonstrate how INP prevents the previously
shown attacks:
• Background attack - Acar et al. - after DNS
Rebinding occurs, the HTTP request, which was
initiated by the script from evil.com with an exter-
nal address, accesses an IoT device with an internal
address. Therefore this request is a cross-network
request. The browser would then send an INP pre-
flight request to the device, which would probably
not accept it. For that reason, the attacker’s cross-
network request would not be sent.
• Attack I - INP acts here just as the same as the
case of Acar et al. attack. Instead of sending the
INP preflight request to an IoT device, it would be
sent to the home router.
• Attack II - the attack script from evil.com, trig-
gers a request to an internal device. This is of
course a cross-network request, which causes INP
to send a preflight request to the device.
• Attack III - in this case, we show that INP handles
request which were not only initiated by a dynamic
script, but also from static HTML elements. INP
would prevent the two steps which are required for
the attack:
– Step of HTML form - which sends the login
request to the home router which is classified
as a cross-network request.
– Redirection - the attacker attempts to redi-
rect the victim’s browser from evil.com to the
home router. However, this redirection is also
a cross-network request, as its originated from
evil.com with an external address and it is tar-
get is the home router whose address is an in-
ternal one.
4.3 Functional Evaluation
INP is backward compatible, it only adds functionality
in the cross-network event and otherwise the browser
behaves the same as without INP.
One of the major advantages of INP is the fact that
it is implemented in the web browser. This is critical as
web browsers are frequently updated [8] which is not the
case with most devices such as routers supplied by ISPs
and IoT devices. Thus all internal devices are protected
by INP without any updates to the devices themselves.
A major concern during designing INP was to avoid
breaking any existing functionality in internal network
resources, such as IoT devices. For example, INP allows
by default an internal resource, to send HTTP requests
through the user’s browser to other internal resources.
There are systems, such as smart homes, which use this
internal access as part of their functionality. As will be
described in our experiments (Section 5), we checked
if there is any access by design, from an external en-
tity (e.g., a cloud server) to an internal network IoT
device, through the web browser. We did not find any.
Additionally, if a user wishes to surf directly to an in-
ternal network resource (such as an IoT web interface),
it is recognized as internal to internal and is allowed by
INP.
INP and SOP are naturally integrated together. In
cases where a cross-network request is also a cross-origin
complex one (this term was discussed in Subsection 3.1),
then the browser sends a preflight request with both
INP and SOP relevant headers. When the preflight re-
sponse is received, both INP and SOP validations are
required.
4.4 Practical Implementation
In order to validate the feasibility, security and func-
tionality properties of the INP, we implemented a PoC
(Proof of Concept) of INP in the Chromium web
browser [38]. Following are some of the practical chal-
lenges we overcame in the implementation of INP in
Chromium.
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INP Headers
INP preflight request headers INP preflight response headers
X-INP-Source-Origin X-INP-Allow-Origin
X-INP-Source-IP X-INP-Allow-IP
X-INP-Request-Method X-INP-Allow-Methods
X-INP-Request-Headers X-INP-Allow-Headers
X-INP-TTL
Table 2: INP HTTP headers introduction
To detect cross-network requests, for each request
that is made, the browser maintains the IP of the re-
quest initiator (the IP of the website which created that
request) and determines the destination IP address of
the request. If the initiator address is external and the
destination address of the request is internal, then a
cross-network event handling is invoked.
In the PoC in Chromium, we were lucky to find the
initial work of Mike West [17] (see Section 2) to track
whether an HTTP request is cross-network or not. How-
ever, we had to deal with several key differences: (i)
our definition of internal is dynamic and more general,
(ii) we had to add the preflight request and response
handling, with all the extra parameters that are passed
along (such as the initiator IP address), and (iii) in
many scenarios the implementation in [17] makes the
decision before the request destination has been resolved
and thus might miss a cross-network request.
Tracking the IP address of the request initia-
tor: Every request which is made by the browser, has an
initiator, the web page within which the request is made.
The request’s initiator’s IP address is simply taken from
the socket through which the browser reached to the ini-
tiator (e.g., the web page). Conceptually, the request’s
initiator IP address extraction in INP is similar to the
web origin extraction in SOP, and follows similar steps.
Extracting the request destination IP address:
A naive simple way would be to take the IP address after
any required DNS resolution, just before the request is
about to be made. However, due to the way Chromium
is coded, the offered modifications by Mike West [17]
check for cross-network request before some of the re-
quest destination domains are resolved. Thus it might
miss a cross-network request because its destination IP
address has not yet been resolved. Such cases still leave
the door open for DNS rebinding attacks. To overcome
this issue we added in our PoC a DNS resolution be-
fore each point where a cross-network detection is tak-
ing place and the destination is still given as a domain
name and not as an IP address. Notice that this leaves
a few microseconds (small number of machine instruc-
tions) between the time INP determined the destination
IP address and the time the browser resolved the request
IP address and has determined whether the request is
cross-network. Thus theoretically a DNS rebinding at-
tack could still take place with extremely small prob-
ability, if it is done in these few microseconds. Notice
this is only a PoC implementation. In the real imple-
mentations of INP we suggest to make the cross-network
detection after all the browser resolutions took place.
Address space classification: To dynamically ac-
quire the internal network address space the browser
can simply use the API of the machine it is running
on (Windows, Linux, etc.) to get the network inter-
faces, IP addresses and subnet masks (both IPv4 and
IPv6). For compatibility with larger organizational net-
works, which contain more than one address space, INP
offers the network administrators the option to manu-
ally configure the organizational internal network ad-
dress spaces. This can easily be implemented with an
XML configuration file, which spreads in the network
through management protocols such as GPO [39]. An
example of an XML configuration file is shown in Figure
7 in Appendix B.
More technical details about our PoC implementation
can be found in Appendix B.
5 Experiments
In this section, we review the experiments we have done
during our research. These include the setup of our
three presented attacks, along with testing of our INP
proof of concept.
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5.1 Attack I - Attacking home routers
with DNS Rebinding & UPnP
In order to simulate the attack execution, we used an
Amazon Linux server on EC2 to host the attacker’s ma-
licious website (referred to earlier as evil.com). For the
DNS Rebinding simulation, we set the victim’s DNS
server to be the Amazon server on EC2. The routers
we chose to test the attack on are the most popular
among the largest ISPs in our region, as verified with
183 students and colleagues. We tested the whole cycle
with each vendor, from surfing to the attacker’s web-
site to attempting to send the UPnP commands to the
router.
Most of the routers which enable UPnP in the LAN
are vulnerable to our attack. Routers that are not vul-
nerable usually include a unique identifier in the UPnP
URL (such us UUID). As the attacker does not have
direct access to the router’s LAN, the identifier cannot
be acquired; thus, the UPnP server cannot be accessed.
By sending an SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Pro-
tocol) M-SEARCH [40] request to a router, its UPnP
server (if available) would respond with the server
URL. This provides the attack code enough informa-
tion, whether the router is vulnerable or not.
Table 3, presents the router distribution and the re-
sults of the experiments. More specific details about the
vendors and the exact exploitation (such as the UPnP
URL) can be viewed in Appendix A. As can be seen in
Table 3, 75% of the tested routers are vulnerable to the
attack.
5.2 Attack II - Attacking internal de-
vices without DNS Rebinding
The setup for this attack is quite simple, as we only use
an Amazon Linux server to host our malicious website.
We examined two IoT devices at home and created a
proper attack script to control them.
Yamaha Network AV Receiver The Yamaha
RX-V683 Network AV Receiver exposes a web man-
agement interface on port 80. An attacker can send
specific commands to the URL: ”/YamahaRemoteCon-
trol/ctrl” to take control of the device. The commands
are sent in HTTP POST requests without any authen-
tication or customized headers needed. The body of the
request is an XML (although no Content-Type HTTP
header is necessary). Beside the web management in-
terface which, listens on port 80, we discovered that the
Yamaha RX-V683 Network AV Receiver exposes an in-
terface which listens on port 49154. Therefore, after
scanning the internal network for a device which listens
on this unique port, we sent the relevant HTTP request
to control the device.
Sony Smart TV An attacker can send commands
(HTTP POST request) without authentication directly
to the HTTP web server of a Sony Smart TV with the
URL: ”/sony/IRCC?”. Just as in the case of Yamaha,
the command itself is an XML which appears in the
body of the HTTP request. Sony supports many differ-
ent commands, such as Power Off, Volume Control and
Display Control, etc.
5.3 Attack III - Attacking home routers
through static HTML elements
Beside the website we host at Amazon, which acts as
evil.com, in this attack, we also used our smartphone to
set up a mobile hotspot. We tested the same routers as
in Attack I. A simple experiment of creating a hotspot
(with an HTML script tag as its name) and surfing
to the router’s AP List page can indicate whether the
router is vulnerable to XSS. We used the network name
<script>alert("HACKED")</script>
which popped up a message box in the victim’s browser
(see Figure 6) when surfing to the AP List page. We
tested the full attack flow, rather than this vulnerability
alone. 41% of the tested routers were vulnerable to the
attack. The results are presented in Table 3.
Figure 6: Indication for a vulnerable Sagemcom router
5.4 Vulnerability disclosure
We reported the vulnerabilities discovered throughout
our research to the respective router (D-Link, TP-Link,
VTech, Sagemcom, ADB) and IoT (Yamaha, Sony) ven-
dors. Some of their security response teams are in con-
tact with us, working together to fix the vulnerabilities.
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Tested Routers
Router vendor Popularity Is vulnerable to Attack II? Is vulnerable to Attack IV?
Sagemcom Fast 22% V V
VTech 14% V X
TP-Link 23% V X
ADB Broadband Fast 16% V X
D-Link 19% X V
Table 3: Attacks II & IV experiments results
5.5 Testing INP
5.5.1 Security
As described in the INP implementation (Subsection
4.4), to provide a proof of concept, we developed our
version of Chromium, which applies INP. We tested the
effectiveness of INP against our attacks in our compiled
version of Chromium on a Windows 10 machine. Our
INP implementation successfully prevented all of our
attacks by sending a preflight request to the internal
network target instead of the attacker’s malicious cross-
site request.
5.5.2 Performance
We also examined the performance difference between
the INP version of Chromium and the original one. As
discussed earlier, the implementation manifests itself
mostly as parsing and extraction of the HTTP headers
and string comparison in the address space classifica-
tion. The comparison is executed for any request, and
the header parsing is only for INP preflight requests. In
order to handle requests whose destination host is not
an IP address, but a domain name, we added a preced-
ing DNS resolution step, as explained in Subsection 4.4.
In the beginning, our DNS resolution occurred at every
processing by Chromium of any HTTP request. This
dramatically lowered the browser’s performance. Web-
sites which were usually loaded by Chromium after a
few seconds, were loaded by our browser version after a
minute. Then, we made a significant improvement by
removing most of the times where the DNS resolution
took place, keeping only the required for correctly de-
termining cross-network requests (technical details can
be viewed in Appendix B). We had practically no no-
ticeable overhead when accessing a web application in
our tests.
5.5.3 Functionality
While designing INP, we supposed that there is no legit-
imate access by design from an external entity (e.g., a
cloud server) to an internal network IoT device, through
the web browser. As part of our experiments, we used
Fiddler [41], a web debugging proxy, to extract HTTP
(and HTTPS) traffic from workstations in home net-
works. In the extracted sessions, we looked for refer-
ences for IP addresses in the workstation’s LAN, or for
DNS hosts which are not external web servers. Fortu-
nately, we did not find any of those.
6 Availability
We release samples of the attacks presented in this paper
[42] along with our PoC implementation of INP with
the Chromium web browser [43], in a dedicated Github
repository.
As part of the responsible vulnerabilities disclosure
process, we do not release specific vendors’ details on-
line, but present the HTML pages, which evil.com would
send the victim’s browser in the demonstrated attacks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have spotted the key vulnerability in
most of the attacks behind a NAT, which use the web
browser as a stepping stone. We realized that no mat-
ter which attacks are used, the browser would eventually
be instructed by an external entity to access an internal
network resource. Many studies have been conducted
over the years [11, 15, 44], most of them trying to pre-
vent specific issues, while the root problem still exists.
We have shown three attacks, each of which presents a
different perspective of the problem. We then presented
Internal Network Policy (INP), which deals with and
solves the root cause and provides protection to users
and organizations from being attacked and penetrated.
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Appendices
A Attacks
A.1 Attack I - Attacking home routers
with DNS Rebinding & UPnP
A.1.1 Attacking randomized port UPnP
servers
There are routers, such as ADB Broadband or Asus,
whose UPnP port is randomized at every boot of the
device. According to standard convention [45], the dy-
namic port range is 49152-65535, which means 16384
possible ports. However, there are routers such as ADB
whose random UPnP port can be even lower then the
specified above range. According to our experiments,
Fetch API [46] can be used to scan ten thousands ports
efficiently, with the no-cors mode. Due to that, the at-
tacker may add an additional step, scanning the router
and then targeting the relevant discovered UPnP port.
In our experiments, we succeed achieving a random
UPnP port, in about 8 minutes.
A.1.2 Vulnerable devices UPnP URLs
See Table 4 for vulnerable home routers and the cor-
responding URLs that invoke the required UPnP com-
mand:
The specific versions that we checked are:
• Sagemcom: Fast 3184, Fast 3284
• V-Tech: NB403, IAD604, IAD605D
• TP-Link: VR400, VR600, W8970, W9970, Archer
C7, Archer C9
• ADB Broadband: VV2220, VV5823
A.2 Attack II - Attacking internal de-
vices without DNS Rebinding
A.2.1 Internal IoT devices identification
In order to succeed, the attacker should identify an IoT
device unique fingerprint, which could be detected while
scanning the internal network, using the victim’s web
browser. As mentioned, this scanning should not utilize
DNS Rebinding. We give some conceptual fingerprints
and their detection methods.
• Unique open port on the device, can be discovered
with port scanning [47].
• DNS name of the device, can be discovered with
host scanning [47].
• Scanning specific unique URL which the device ex-
poses [30].
A.3 Attack III - Attacking home
routers without using scripts
A.3.1 Scanning using static HTML tags
Web servers, including those in home routers, tend to
expose static web resources, such as images and scripts,
without any authentication. In most of our attacks sce-
narios, this fact lets an external attacker identify what
is the gateway vendor (and even version and firmware),
only by trying to access common known static resources.
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Vulnerable Routers
Router vendor UPnP server TCP port UPnP Control API URL
Sagemcom Fast 80 /WANIPConnection
V-Tech 49600 /upnp/control/WANIPConn1
TP-Link 1900 /ctl/IPConn or /upnp/control/WANIPConn1
ADB Broadband Random /ctl/WANPPPConnectionUPNP
Table 4: Routers vulnerable to attack I
As has been presented in a previous project [30], an at-
tacker may prepare a fingerprints database in advance,
to successfully identify home routers.
A.3.2 Wireless AP List
There are routers whose web management interface ex-
poses features such as AP List. This component pro-
vides the user wtih all the access points that are reach-
able to the router. The panel contains a basic table,
with a few columns including the WiFi network name.
The network name parameter is obtained directly from
the access point itself.
A.3.3 Routers Session Management
There are mainly two different session management
methods used in routers, and probably in most web
servers: cookies or IP based sessions. By using cook-
ies, after the user successfully enter valid credentials,
the router’s web server sets a session cookie, which the
browser uses during the session. In IP based session
management, the user’s session (based on his IP ad-
dress) is saved in the router. In order to gain access to
web pages, such as the AP List panel, all a user needs
to do is send the relevant HTTP request, within the
current active session.
B INP
B.1 INP Chromium implementation
B.1.1 Current implementation
In the source code of the Chromium project [38], the
object that is responsible for managing HTTP requests
and tracking their status, is ResourceRequest. This ob-
ject includes many fields of a request, such as URL,
origin, etc. The field that provides SOP with the in-
formation required to decide if a request should be re-
stricted or not, is request initiator. For every HTTP
request, the request initiator tells what is the origin, of
the resource which initiated the current request.
The ResourceRequest has two classes. The first one
takes place in the rendering process, which is responsi-
ble for processing data received from the network traffic,
and display web pages to the user. The second one is in
the browser process, and is responsible for sending and
receiving data to/from the network, including capabil-
ities such as sending HTTP requests and performing
DNS resolution.
The method in the code which determines HTTP re-
quests as cross-network (in the current offered modifi-
cations given in [17] they are call external), is SetEx-
ternalRequestStateFromRequestorAddressSpace. This
method is implemented in the ResourceRequest class of
the rendering process. However, in case where an HTTP
request is about to be sent by the browser, and its des-
tination is not an IP address but a domain name, the
DNS resolution occurs only in the browser process, as
explained earlier. This means that if the method Se-
tExternalRequestStateFromRequestorAddressSpace, in
the rendering process, handles an HTTP request whose
destination is a domain name, the check would fail, and
the request would not be considered as cross-network.
Thus attacks as DNS Rebinding would not be prevented
by the current modifications given in [17].
B.1.2 INP implementation
We briefly mention here the most critical changes we
have made in the source code of Chromium, to properly
integrate INP.
Address space classification: SetExternalRe-
questStateFromRequestorAddressSpace eventually
checks whether the destination of an HTTP request,
is in the browser’s local network or not. The method
in the code that performs this check, is called Is-
PubliclyRoutable. Because the original method only
compared an IP address to static address spaces,
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we overrode it, and added comparison of the IP to
the local network of the browser (using the running
machine utilities such as NETSH in Windows) and to
an XML file for organizations which can be configured
by network admins (see Figure 7 for an example).
Figure 7: INP Configuration example
Handling cross-network requests whose desti-
nation is not an IP address: In order to prevent
attacks which target hosts whose address given as a do-
main name, instead of IP addresses, we had to address
the challenge mentioned earlier. Because the DNS res-
olution occurs only in the browser process, we have to
add an additional resolution step, which is executed by
the rendering process. Two challenges had to be over-
come in this part of the implementation:
1. Process permissions - The rendering process
is sandboxed and do not have any permission to
execute network actions such as DNS resolution.
Therefore, we implemented a helper process, that
executed a DNS resolution on demand, and added
a specific rule in the code which allowed sandboxed
process, to run the helper process.
2. Performance - In the beginning, we executed the
DNS resolution at every call of SetExternalRe-
questStateFromRequestorAddressSpace. When we
tested our compiled browser, we realized that the
performance dropped as pages whose loading time
was originally one second, where loaded only after
a minute in our version. After a debugging ses-
sion, we understood that SetExternalRequestState-
FromRequestorAddressSpace is called many times
per every HTTP request. Therefore, we moved
the DNS resolution step from this method, to the
code of CorsURLLoader, which checks for every
HTTP request if SetExternalRequestStateFromRe-
questorAddressSpace marked the request as cross-
network, and eventually handles the preflight re-
quests. This change has improved the performance,
and, in our tests we had no noticeable overhead
when accessing a web application.
B.1.3 Future work
In our current proof of concept, we only handle cross-
network requests which target IPv4 addresses. Addi-
tionally, we do not support the preflight caching mech-
anism, so every cross-network request will cause the
browser to send a preflight request, even if a previous
positive response was received recently.
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